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Abstract
This study proposes a quantum secret authentication code for protecting the
integrity of secret quantum states. Since BB84[1] was first proposed, the eaves-
dropper detection strategy in almost all quantum cryptographic protocols is based
on the random sample discussion, in which the probability of eavesdropper detec-
tion is depending on the number of check qubits eavesdropped by the eavesdropper.
Hence, if the eavesdropper interferes only a few qubits of the transmitted quantum
sequence, then the detection probability will be very low. This study attempts to
propose a quantum secret authentication code to solve this problem. With the use
of quantum secret authentication code, not only is the probability of eavesdropper
detection guaranteed to be evenly distributed no matter how many qubits had been
eavesdropped, but also can the quantum transmission efficiency be highly enhanced.
keywords: message authentication code, integrity, random sampling
1 Introduction
In 1984, BB84, the first quantum cryptographic protocol was proposed. For the next
decade, the eavesdropper detection strategy, following the idea of BB84, for almost all
quantum cryptographic protocols is based on the random sample discussion. In this
eavesdropper detection method, the check qubits are independent to the message qubits.
By scrambling the message qubits with the check qubits together, the strategy assumes
∗corresponding author
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that an eavesdropper has no idea on discriminating a check qubit from a message qubit.
An attempt to eavesdrop the qubit sequence by an outsider would only end up disturbing
the check qubit states. And, the only chance for an eavesdropper detection is when the
check qubits were altered “inadvertently” by the eavesdropper. Hence, the more check
qubits altered by an eavesdropper, the higher probability he/she is detected.
In order to increase the detection probability. The number of check qubits should be
large enough, because the eavesdropper detection probability for interfering one check
qubit is
number o f check qubits
Tatal number o f qubits ×
1
4
where the number o f check qubitsTatal number o f qubits represents the probability of the eavesdropper to choose a
check qubit, and 14 is the probability that the measurement result of that check qubit is
different from what was expected due to the interference of that eavesdropper. Most
protocols suggest the number of check qubits should be at least the same as that of the
message qubits transmitted [4, 5, 6, 7].
However, there is a problem with the random sampling discussion strategy, espe-
cially when an eavesdropper just attempts to eavesdrop only a few qubits in the trans-
mitted quantum sequence. In this situation, some information might be revealed, and
the integrity of the message qubits might be jeopardized, but the eavesdropper detection
probability could still be very low. Most quantum cryptographic protocols ignore this
problem and conversely assume that the eavesdropper always attempts to eavesdrop the
entire sequence of qubits. Consequently, the conclusion, the probability of eavesdropper
detection can reach 1, is asserted.
This paper aims to design a quantum secret authentication code (QSAC) to solve
the above-mentioned problem. This QSAC guarantees the integrity of the secret qubits
transmitted from a sender to a receiver. Furthermore, the intentionally designed avalanche
effect guarantees the detection of an eavesdropping of even a single qubit in the quantum
sequence.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the proposed quan-
tum secret authentication code and the security analysis. Section 3 gives an application
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of the proposed QSAC. Finally, conclusions are made in Section 4.
2 Quantum secret authentication code
In this section, a quantum secret authentication code (QSAC) is proposed for a receiver to
verify whether or not the received states are indeed from the alleged sender and without
being eavesdropped or modified.
2.1 Notations
K the pre-shared key between the sender and the receiver.
|| concatenation.
|M〉i the i th qubit in the quantum sequence M.
CNOT(a,b) Control-Not gate, where a is the control qubit and b is the target qubit. If
a = b, then performs the identity operation I.
2.2 The avalanche effect
A CNOT gate is applied here to create an avalanche effect in the QSAC. Figure 1 demon-
strates an avalanche effect of the QSAC. Assume that there is a function F with a se-
quence of quantum states as the input and a sequence of entangled qubits as the output.
The function is composed of a sequence of CNOT operations. For example, let the in-
put of the function be a three-qubit quantum state |ψ〉123 and the output, CNOT (q1,q2)
CNOT (q2,q3)CNOT (q3,q1) |ψ〉. Conversely, the inverse function F−1 should be CNOT
(q3,q1)CNOT (q2,q3)CNOT (q1,q2) |ψ〉. An avalanche effect is described under a com-
munication model between a sender and a receiver. First, the sender inputs the state,
|000〉 for example, to the function F and subsequently, F outputs the state |000〉. Then
the sender sends the qubits |000〉 to the receiver via a quantum channel. During the time
of transmission, if there is no eavesdropper, then the same state |000〉 will be received
and recovered by the receiver, i.e., |000〉 → F−1 → |000〉. Conversely, assume the last
qubit is altered by an outsider, i.e., the state received by the receiver becomes |001〉.
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Consequently, the receiver inputs the received state |001〉 to F−1, the inversion of the
function F. The state that the receiver finally recovers is |110〉. Obviously, one single
qubit modification eventually causes more than one qubits to change.
Figure 1: The avalanche effect of the QSAC.
2.3 The proposed QSAC
Based on the technique described in Sec. 2.2, this section proposes a QSAC design that
marries a pre-shared key, K, between a sender and a receiver to a message qubits, |M〉 to
be transmitted from the sender to the receiver via a sequence of CNOT operations in such
a way that only a few qubits’ interference to the transmitted qubits by an outsider without
knowing K would cause an avalanche effect on the qubits recovered by the receiver.
Figure 2 shows the procedure of the QSAC. The sender first inputs the message qubits,
|M〉, and the shared key, K, to the QSAC algorithm. The QSAC algorithm generates check
qubits from K and outputs a QSAC codeword which strongly entangles the message
qubits and the check qubits. Then, the sender sends the QSAC codeword to the receiver.
For verification, the receiver inputs the received codeword and the shared key K to the
verification algorithm to “extract” the message qubits and the check qubits. Finally, by
verifying the correctness of the check qubits, the receiver can verify whether or not the
message qubits are indeed from the legitimate participant and are without eavesdropping
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on modifications from an outsider.
Figure 2: The procedure of QSAC.
A. QSAC encoding:
The following steps demonstrate the encoding of the proposed QSAC. The inputs are the
secret message qubits |M〉 of length m and the key K of length k bits shared between the
sender and the receiver.
Step1 Extend the key K to KQ and KT , via an extension function, which can be so
designed as the key scheduling in DES or AES. The lengths of KQ and KT
will be understood in the following description.
Step2 Transform KQ to a quadratic string SQ of length n and every element of SQ
is in {0,1,2,3}, where n is the security parameter determines the number
of check qubits. Then, a sequence of check qubits |C〉 =
∣∣∣S1Q
〉
⊗
∣∣∣S2Q
〉
⊗
·· · ⊗
∣∣∣S jQ
〉
can be generated according to SQ. The elements in {0,1,2,3}
of SQ represents the states {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉} of check qubits, respectively.
That is, if the element in SQ is “0”, then the state “|0〉” is produced and
so on. For example, if SQ is “012130”, then the check qubits should be
“|0〉 |1〉 |+〉 |1〉 |−〉 |0〉“.
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Step3 Attach the message qubits to the check qubits as |ψ〉n+m = |C〉n⊗|M〉m.
Step4 Transform KT to a digit string ST of length (n+m) and every element of
ST is in {1,2,3, · · · ,m+ n}. Perform CNOT operations among the qubits
of |ψ〉n+m according to ST . That is, the index of an element in ST repre-
sents the index of the control qubits in |ψ〉n+m and the corresponding value
of that element in ST is the index of the target qubit in |ψ〉n+m. In other
words, the CNOT operation is performed on the ith qubit in |ψ〉n+m, as the
control qubit and the SiT
th qubit in |ψ〉n+m, as the target qubit. For exam-
ple, if ST = 3412, then the sender first performs CNOT (|ψ〉1 , |ψ〉3) , then
computes CNOT (|ψ〉2 , |ψ〉4) and so on.
Index of ST 1 2 3 4
Value of ST 3 4 1 2
Operation CNOT (|ψ〉1 , |ψ〉3) CNOT (|ψ〉2 , |ψ〉4) CNOT (|ψ〉3 , |ψ〉1) CNOT (|ψ〉4 , |ψ〉2)
Table 1: Example of Step4 in QSAC
B. QSAC decoding:
After the execution of Step4, the message qubits and the check qubits are both strongly
entangled. The verification process mainly is the inversion of the QSAC algorithm. The
inputs to the decoding function are the received QSAC codeword as well as the shared
key K. The following steps demonstrate the details of the verification algorithm.
Step1 The same as the Step1 in the encoding algorithm, the receiver first produces
the sub-keys KQ and KT from K. Because of the pre-shared key K, the sender
and the receiver should have the same sub-keys KQ and KT .
Step2 Similar to the Step4 in the encoding algorithm. The receiver preforms the
inversion of the encoding function to extract the message qubits as well
as the check qubits from the QSAC codeword and K. The receiver trans-
forms KT to a digit string ST of length (n+m) and every element of ST is
in {1,2,3, · · · ,m+ n}. The index of ST represents the index of the control
qubits in |ψ〉n+m and the corresponding value of the element in ST is the
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index of the target qubit in |ψ〉n+m. It should be noted here that in the QSAC
decoding, the order to perform the CNOT operations is the reverse of that in
the QSAC encoding. For the same example, if ST = 3412, then the sender
first performs CNOT (|ψ〉4 , |ψ〉2) , then CNOT (|ψ〉3 , |ψ〉1) and so on.
Index of ST 4 3 2 1
Value of ST 2 1 4 3
Operation CNOT (|ψ〉4 , |ψ〉2) CNOT (|ψ〉3 , |ψ〉1) CNOT (|ψ〉2 , |ψ〉4) CNOT (|ψ〉1 , |ψ〉3)
Table 2: Example of Step2 in verification
Step3 Transform KQ to a quadratic string SQ of length n and every element of SQ is
in {0,1,2,3}. With SQ , the receiver knows the original states of the check
qubits the sender prepared. Consequently, the receiver measures the check
qubits extracted from the QSAC codeword with the corresponding bases.
That is, if the element of Sq is equal to 0 or 1, then Z-basis is used; otherwise
X-basis is used.
Step4 If the the measurement result of check qubits in SQ is the same as the mea-
surement result of the check qubits recovered from the QSAC codeword,
then the secret message qubits are authenticated.
2.4 Security analysis and discussions
This section analyzes the features of the proposed QSAC including: (1) the integrity of
the secret message qubits, and (2) the originality of the secret message qubits.
The secret message integrity ensures that the received message qubits are not eaves-
dropped and modified during the time of transmission in an open quantum channel. Con-
versely, if the message qubits are eavesdropped or modified , then with a high probability
the receiver can detect the interference. To analyze the integrity, let us denote the mes-
sage qubits to be transmitted as |M〉, the check qubits created from the key, K, as |C〉, and
the QSAC codeword state after executing the QSAC encoding algorithm as |ψ〉. Assume
the QSAC codeword state, |ψ〉, was modified by a malicious user into the other state |ψ ′〉.
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Upon receiving |ψ ′〉, the receiver executes the verification function and recovers the state
to |ψ ′′〉. If |ψ ′′〉 6= |ψ〉, then the only situation that the modification passes the verification
process is: (a) a collision occurs, which means that the check qubits |C′′〉 extracted from
|ψ ′′〉 is the same as the check qubits |C〉 produced from K, or (b) |C′′〉 6= |C〉, but their
measurement results are the same.
Assume that the probability for the situation (a) to occur is p(a). Hence, the prob-
ability for the situation (b) to occur is (1− p(a))× ε , where the ε is the probability for
|C′′〉 to have the same measurement result as |C〉, when |C′′〉 6= |C〉. Therefore, the total
probability for the modification to pass the verification process when |ψ ′′〉 6= |ψ〉 is:
ppass = p(a)+(1− p(a))× ε
where
p(a) =
|message space|
|codeword space|
It is noted if the length of check qubits is large enough, then p(a) could approach to
zero. The ppass thus is equal to ε . Since ε is the probability for |C′′〉 to have the same
measurement result as |C〉, where |C′′〉 6= |C〉, ε could be express as: ε = |〈C|C′′〉|2. Let
us assume that only one single qubits ( e.g., the ith check qubit) was modified. As an
example, if |C〉i = |0〉, then |C′′〉i could be |1〉 , |+〉 or |−〉. Similarly, if |C〉i = |1〉, then
|C′′〉i = |0〉 , |+〉 , |−〉 and so on. In any case, ε = 13
(
|〈0| 1〉|2 + |〈0|+〉|2 + |〈0| −〉|2
)
= 13 .
Hence if j check qubits are modified, then ε = (13
) j
. If the length, n, of check qubits is
large enough, then due to the avalanche effect, ε .=
(1
3
) n
2 ≈ 0.
The message originality means that the receiver can verify whether the message is
sent from the same participant whom he/she claimed to be. To impersonate the sender,
an eavesdropper must input a guessed key K’ to the QSAC encoding algorithm to generate
a codeword |ψˆ〉. If K′ 6= K, then the situation for |ψˆ〉 to pass the verification process is
exactly the same as the one described above, whose possibility, PPass, can be ignored.
Note that the main difference between the random sampling discussion and the QSAC
is in the basic assumption for eavesdropper detection. The former assumes that the num-
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ber of check qubits “altered” by an eavesdropper should be large enough, whereas the
latter (QSAC) assumes that the number of check qubits “set” by the designer is large
enough. Hence, for an eavesdropper to be detected with a high probability in the random
sampling discussion, both the number of the check qubits as well as the number of check
qubits altered by the eavesdropper should be large enough. Conversely, due to the design
of an avalanche effect on the QSAC, for a higher eavesdropper detection rate, it requires
only a large enough number of check qubits in the QSAC.
Furthermore, to make an eavesdropper inadvertently alter enough check qubits in the
random sampling approach, the positions of those check qubits should be unknown to
the eavesdropper before these check qubits are received by the receiver. Then, the sender
and the receiver have to communicate back and forth in an authenticated channel later to
discuss of the states, positions, and measurement results of these check qubits to judge
the existence of an eavesdropper. On the other hand, in the QSAC, these overheads can
be removed altogether. The communication between the sender and the receiver can be
simplified to just a one-way communication.
3 Applications
To illustrate the usefulness of the proposed QSAC, a quantum secure direct communica-
tion with authentication based on the Deng’s two-step QSDC[2] is demonstrated. Instead
of assuming the existence of authenticated classical channels, we assume that the sender
and the receiver pre-share a secret key K via some secure ways.
Step 1 The sender prepares a sequence of EPR states in |φ+〉. The sender encodes
his/her classical secret message into a message qubits by performing one
of the four operations
{
I,σx,σz, iσy
}
on the EPR state, which represent the
two-bit classical information {00,01,10,11}, respectively. Subsequently,
the sender encodes the message qubits to a QSAC codeword, and then sends
it to the receiver.
Step 2 Upon receiving the QSAC codeword, the receiver decodes the QSAC code-
word and verifies the correctness of the recovered check qubits. If the code-
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word is authenticated, then the receiver performs Bell measurement on the
EPR state to recover the secret message; otherwise they abort the communi-
cation.
In the original two-step protocol in [2], the EPR pairs should be transmitted separately
in two steps in order to protect the security of the message. Furthermore the sender and
the receiver have to perform public discussions via an authenticated classical channel to
detect the existence of eavesdroppers. However, with the design of the QSAC, these can
be done within one step and without any tedious public discussion to detect the existence
of an eavesdropper.
4 Conclusions
Using the inherent characteristic in quantum of being very susceptible to be eavesdropped,
this paper proposes a QSAC to protect quantum state sequence from being eavesdropped
or modified arbitrarily. As compared to the conventionally used strategy – the random
sample discussion, the QSAC provides efficiency in quantum sequence communication
as well as ease in the design of quantum cryptographic protocols. The assumption of ex-
istence of authenticated classical channels in almost all existing quantum cryptographic
protocols can be removed. Instead, a secret key is assumed to be shared between a sender
and a receiver, which is a more common and practical assumption in modern cryptogra-
phy. A QSAC-based QSDC is designed to demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed
QSAC in the design of various quantum cryptographic protocols. On one hand, though
the strongly self-entangled QSAC codeword makes itself very difficult to be forged or
interfered without detection. On the other, it is quite susceptible to noises in a quantum
channel. Therefore, how to design a QSAC, which is robust under a noisy and lossy
quantum channel would be a very interesting future research.
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